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ABSTRACT
To combat the reputational harm associated with defamatory comments, forty
states allow plaintiffs to recover presumed damages for reputational harm for
defamatory statements considered “per se” defamation without having to prove
the exact dollar figure associated with their reputational damages. While damages
are presumed to a plaintiff’s reputation in a successful defamation per se lawsuit,
the spectrum of presumed damages is so wide that there is almost no practical
way for a plaintiff to reliably know the size of a presumed damages award,
especially a lower-income plaintiff. Plaintiffs cannot evaluate the financial merit
of a defamation lawsuit, which removes the primary benefit of presumed damages.
This is especially problematic for plaintiffs relying on presumed damages to their
reputations to justify the costs of litigation for defamation per se cases, which are
the most egregious types of defamation, and why reputational damages are
presumed. Without some assurance that a defamed plaintiff will be awarded
damages to compensate them for the harm to their reputation, presumed damages
have insufficient practical value—lower income plaintiffs who are defamed and
later struggle to find employment or who live with tarnished reputations will not
pursue litigation while their defamers face no repercussions and no fear of repeating
that behavior. Instead of abolishing the doctrine of presumed damages, which some
states have done because presumed damages are difficult to quantify, a better
approach is to set a guaranteed minimum damages floor associated with presumed
damages for plaintiffs who are successful in a per se defamation claim.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To combat the reputational harm associated with defamatory comments,
forty states1 allow plaintiffs to recover presumed damages for reputational
harm for defamatory statements considered “per se” defamation2 without
having to prove the exact dollar figure associated with their reputational
damages. The combination of email, social media, and technology has
provided us with the ability to communicate thoughts and ideas to masses
of people around the world by a commonplace device that fits in our pocket.
While this modern miracle of human ingenuity serves as a remarkable
mechanism to communicate, defamatory communications may permanently
ruin reputations on a global scale. Take, for example, allegations of sexual
assault made against pop-star Justin Bieber by two women over Twitter
this past year in 2020.3 Although Bieber was able to provide proof that
the allegations were false, his name was nevertheless in headlines associated
with the allegations and some people were no doubt persuaded that he was
guilty as accused.4
Of course, the majority of people are not celebrities, and non-celebrities
may be subject to defamatory statements by those with a large social
media presence. For example, in 2018 Elon Musk tweeted that Vernon
Unsworth was a “pedo guy” when Unsworth made disparaging comments
about a Tesla-engineered submarine sent to aid in the rescue of a youth
football team trapped underground in Thailand.5 For context, Musk has
nearly 30 million followers on Twitter and his tweet made headline news.6
Despite suing Musk for his comments in U.S. court for $190 million in

1. See infra note 133.
2. See infra Section III.A.
3. Jacob Sarkisian, Justin Bieber Has Filed $20 Million Lawsuit Against Two
Women Over “Factually Impossible” Sexual Assault Allegations, INSIDER (June 26, 2020,
6:47 AM), https://www.insider.com/justin-bieber-denies-sexual-assault-allegation-lawsuit2020-6 [https://perma.cc/RV7K-6SXX].
4. Kat Tenbarge, A New #MeToo Movement Is Erupting Online as Allegations of
Sexual Misconduct Hit Celebrities, Influencers, and Streamers, INSIDER (June 23, 2020,
2:43 PM), https://www.insider.com/me-too-allegations-movement-a-list-celebs-streamersbieber-tiktokers-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/KA8V-ZL2Z]; Justin Bieber Denies 2014 Sexual
Assault Allegation, BBC NEWS (June 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat53050621 [https://perma.cc/62TW-5VR3].
5. Elon Musk Wins Defamation Case Over “Pedo Guy” Tweet About Caver, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50695593 [https://
perma.cc/2SA4-F82W].
6. Id.
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damages to his reputation, Unsworth was unsuccessful and now, at sixtyfive years old, must now live with the fact that Musk’s tweet will be a
permanent mark on his legacy.7
However, the vast majority of defamation disputes are not publicized
nationally but are very impactful to the lives and well-being of the defamed
party. For example, in 2019 a bartender in Asbury, New Jersey, was accused
in a Facebook group of drugging a co-worker at a party.8 His name and
picture were later added to a Reddit thread with over 100 comments detailing
rumors and allegations of rape and sexual assault by other women.9 Despite
numerous statements made by several women online and two fellow coworkers, the bartender has never been convicted or even charged with
sexual assault, but as a result of these social media comments, lost his job
shortly after they were published. 10 Although the bartender has filed
a defamation suit, he has moved to several different states because employers
are refusing to hire him based on the allegations.11
While this Article does not take a stance on the veracity of the sexual
assault allegations, the struggles of the plaintiff in these cases highlight an
under-discussed issue faced by plaintiffs seeking presumed reputational
damages. Assuming arguendo that the allegations are completely false,
and the bartender prevails on his defamation suit, there is no guarantee he
will be awarded damages to compensate him for the reputational harm. In
the United States, juries or judges affix damages after they find that
defamatory statements were made.12 At common law, the notion of presumed
damages means that, because assessing reputational damages is so difficult, the
trier of fact is free to determine a dollar amount to adequately compensate
the plaintiff given the facts presented at trial and their own sensibilities.13
7. Id.; see also Erik Wemple, Trump Supporter’s Libel Case Against MSNBC’s
Joy Reid Lives On, WASH. P OST (July 16, 2020, 9:27 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/2020/07/16/trump-supporters-libel-case-against-msnbcs-joy-reid-lives/
[https://perma.cc/R9QM-HQV5] (discussing a woman’s libel suit against media personality
Joy Reid for tweeting an out-of-context photo of the woman and comparing the photo to
an infamous photo of a segregationist berating one of the Little Rock Nine).
8. Kelly Heyboer, This N.J. Bartender Was Accused of Rape by Women on Social
Media. Now He’s Suing Them., N.J.COM (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.nj.com/news/2020/
02/this-nj-bartender-was-accused-of-rape-by-women-on-social-media-now-hes-suingthem.html [https://perma.cc/RER7-8BRT].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61
(1985) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 765 (4th
ed. 1971)).
13. See, e.g., Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 605 (Tex. 2002) (noting that,
at common law, although the jury is given latitude to assess damages, liability may not be
found where there is no evidence to support it.).
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While this may work in favor of some plaintiffs, 14 the uncertainty of
damages awards could mean that a plaintiff like the bartender could spend
tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation fees and only
receive a nominal award for damages to their reputation.15
This is especially problematic for plaintiffs relying on presumed damages
to their reputations to justify the costs of litigation for defamation per se
cases, which are the most egregious types of defamation, and why reputational
damages are presumed. Without some assurance that a defamed plaintiff
will be awarded damages to compensate them for the harm to their reputation,
presumed damages have insufficient practical value—lower income plaintiffs
who are defamed and later struggle to find employment, or who live with
tarnished reputations, will not pursue litigation while their defamers face
no repercussions and no fear of repeating that behavior. Instead of abolishing
the doctrine of presumed damages, which some states have done because
presumed damages are difficult to quantify,16 a better approach is to set a
guaranteed minimum damages floor associated with presumed damages
for plaintiffs who are successful in a per se defamation claim.
II. HISTORY OF DEFAMATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM 1735 – PRESENT
A. Colonial and New Republic Era – Establishing Truth as a Defense
In the same way that “All roads lead to Rome,” the same concept traces
U.S. defamation17 law from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.18 Both royal19

14. See infra Section III.B.3.a.3.
15. See infra Section III.B.1.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See 1 R ODNEY A. S MOLLA , LAW OF D EFAMATION § 1:10 (2d ed. 2013)
(“Defamation is the generic term for the twin torts of libel and slander . While most
jurisdictions maintain the traditional distinction between libel and slander, some treat them
as one tort, for ‘defamation.’”); id. § 1:11 (“The short and simple distinction between the
terms is that libel is defamation by written or printed words, or by the embodiment of the
communication in some tangible or physical form, while slander consists of communication of
a defamatory statement by spoken words, or by transitory gestures.”).
18. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3
COLUM. L. REV. 546, 547–49 (1903) (discussing the British defamation laws’ complicated
origins drawing from Germanic, Roman, and Norman defamation laws).
19. Id. at 549 (discussing King Alfred the Great’s Anglo-Saxon courts in the mid to
late 800s).
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and religious courts20 used defamation laws for centuries to stifle public
and private criticism of the existing regal and ecclesiastical powers.21 “In
the ninth century, public slander was ‘to be compensated with no lighter
a penalty than the cutting off of the slanderer’s tongue.’”22 As such,
defamation laws in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition were more concerned
with preserving social order rather than providing a metaphorical sword
for harmed individuals or a shield for public debate and discourse.23 The
American colonists would make a significant break from this mold in the
seminal case Crown v. John Peter Zenger,24 which espoused the bedrock
principal of all U.S. defamation law: Truth as an absolute defense.25
The facts resulting in the Zenger case arose in colonial New York in
1733, after New York Chief Judge Lewis Morris publicly circulated
a dissenting opinion he wrote in a case involving the recently appointed
British Royal Governor of New York, William Cosby.26 Irate over Morris’s
decision to circulate the dissenting opinion, Governor Cosby removed Chief
Judge Morris from his post, prompting Morris and his allies to create a
pro-colonist, anti-Cosby newspaper named the New-York Weekly Journal.27
After several unsuccessful attempts to shut the newspaper down, 28
20. Id. at 550–51 (discussing the Church’s prosecution of defamation as a sin against
God).
21. Id. at 566 (discussing royal and ecclesiastical use of defamation laws against
publishers who dared to question authority).
22. Gerald R. Smith, Of Malice and Men: The Law of Defamation, 27 VAL. U. L.
REV. 39, 39 (1992) (quoting Colin Rhys Lovell, The “Reception” of Defamation by the
Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1962)).
23. See Lovell, supra note 22, at 1053.
24. See Paul McGrath, People v. Croswell: Alexander Hamilton and the Transformation
of the Common Law of Libel, 2011 JUD. NOTICE 5, 9, 15–17 (establishing that truth is a
justification provided that the matter was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1976) (“At
common law the majority position has been that although the plaintiff must allege falsity
in his complaint, the falsity of a defamatory communication is presumed. It has been
consistently held that truth is an affirmative defense which must be raised by the defendant
and on which he has the burden of proof.”). But see W. S. Holdsworth, Defamation in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, III, 41 L.Q. REV. 13, 28 (1925). There are also some
relatively modern cases holding that truth is not a complete defense. See, e.g., Hutchins
v. Page, 75 N.H. 689, 689 (1909); Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of
Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 S TAN. L. REV . 789, 802 (1964);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 582 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1938). A minority of jurisdictions
made truth a conditional defense that the plaintiff could overcome by showing malicious
motive or publication without justifiable end. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 582 cmt.
a (AM. L. INST. 1938).
26. Crown v. John Peter Zenger, 1735, HIST. SOC’Y N.Y. CTS., https://history.nycourts.
gov/case/crown-v-zenger/ [https://perma.cc/4NP2-ZVJE].
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Governor Cosby eventually circumvented judicial procedural safeguards
to arrest John Peter Zenger, the newspaper’s printer, and charged him with
seditious libel.29 At trial, Zenger admitted to publishing the seditious material
as alleged by the New York Attorney General.30 Addressing the jury in Mr.
Zenger’s defense, pro-colonist lawyer Andrew Hamilton famously declared:
The question before the Court and you, Gentlemen of the jury, is not of small or
private concern. It is not the cause of one poor printer, nor of New York alone,
which you are now trying. No! It may in its consequence affect every free man
that lives under a British government on the main of America. It is the best cause.
It is the cause of liberty.31

Hamilton’s argument appealed to the jurors, who returned a verdict of
“not guilty” despite Zenger’s admissions.32 Founding Father Gouverneur
Morris, the grandchild of Chief Judge Morris, later stated that the Zenger
case birthed “the germ of American freedom, the morning star of that
liberty which subsequently revolutionized America!”33 The outcome of
the Zenger case was significant because it helped establish the notion that
the truth could be used as an absolute defense against a defamation cause
of action.34
Despite the Zenger case’s purported impact on free speech at the time,
the concept of truth as a defense was not addressed in the federal Constitution
nor was it adopted by any of the state constitutions.35 The catalyst for the
systemic adoption of truth as a defense came from the 1804 case People
v. Croswell.36 In the wake of President Thomas Jefferson’s election, his
Democratic-Republican Party sought to curb political dissent of the new
administration through “a few prosecutions” of local newspapers through
state common law seditious libel charges.37 Harry Croswell, the young editor
of the Federalist paper The Wasp, was targeted for his criticisms and

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The United Kingdom only recently adopted this defense in 2013. Defamation
Act 2013, c. 26, § 2 (UK).
35. But see Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801) (providing for
truth as a defense against criminal libel charges).
36. See McGrath, supra note 24, at 5.
37. Id.
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charged with criminal libel and sedition in New York.38 Eventually Croswell’s
case was heard before the entire New York Supreme Court of Judicature.39
On appeal, Founding Father, and leading federalist, Alexander Hamilton
himself took up the case and argued that Croswell’s charges should be
dismissed, citing the Zenger principle of truth as a defense.40 Ultimately
the four justices evenly split their votes on whether to order a new trial,41
leaving Croswell’s conviction standing.42 Nevertheless, Croswell was never
sentenced,43 and subsequently the New York Legislature incorporated the
Zenger principle into the 1821 state constitution.44 Eventually, virtually all
states followed suit, cementing the Zenger principle and Hamilton’s argument
in Croswell as the “common sense of all American criminal libel law.”45
38. Id.; see also id. at 11 (describing that, initially, the case was presided over by
Chief Justice Morgan Lewis of the New York Supreme Court of Judicature in a jury trial,
but after Chief Justice Lewis’s jury instructions effectively barred the Zenger truth as a
defense argument, the jury had no choice but to deliver a verdict of guilty at the trial level).
39. Id. at 12; see also The Supreme Court of Judicature, 1691–1776, HIST. SOC’Y
N.Y. CTS., https://history.nycourts.gov/case/supreme-court-judicature/ [https://perma.cc/
9QR3-3Y2M] (effectively a late seventeenth and eighteenth century version of an appeals
court, the Supreme Court of Judicature consisted of a Chief Justice, a Second Justice, and
three Associate Justices).
40. McGrath, supra note 24, at 15–16.
41. Id. at 13, 16 (although the Supreme Court of Judicature comprised of five sitting
justices, the New York Attorney General prosecuting the Croswell case had just been
named the fifth justice of the court while preparing the trial, resulting in his recusal from
the Bench for the duration of the case).
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id.; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 8 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write,
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right;
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In
all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence, to the jury;
and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.”).
45. See Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A
Reappraisal, 1970 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 159 n.159 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 297 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that the outcome of Croswell and New
York’s 1821 Constitution “basically . . . states the common sense of American criminal
libel law” because Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
substantially adopted it, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington provide for free press and
speech though speakers are liable for abuse, and Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Rhode Island,
and West Virginia provide substantially the same protections but add that truth may be
given in evidence in a libel prosecution)); cf. Beauharnais, 343 at 297–98, 297 n.15 (stating
that only Connecticut, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts,
whose Constitutions were framed earlier than New York’s, have a more general freedom
of the press standards—the Massachusetts model states: “The liberty of the press is
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B. Modern Development of the Actual Malice
Standard in Defamation Suits
For about the next 140 years, defamation remained largely within the
common law of the states 46 because the U.S. Supreme Court viewed
defamation as outside the purview of the First Amendment. 47 This
jurisprudence changed in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.48 In 1960, several Civil Rights Movement leaders purchased an
advertisement in the New York Times calling for donations to Martin
Luther King Jr.’s legal defense against a lawsuit in Alabama.49 While the
advertisement accurately described the struggles faced by civil rights
activists at the hands of the Montgomery Police Department, it also contained
numerous inaccuracies and false implications.50 As a result, the Montgomery
Public Safety Commissioner sued the Times for libel on the ground that
the advertisement’s criticisms of the police were defamatory to himself
given his advisory role over the police’s conduct.51 The Alabama trial court
instructed the jury that the advertisement itself was libelous per se under
Alabama law, meaning damage to Sullivan’s reputation was presumed,

essential to the security of freedom in a state it ought not, therefore, to be restricted in this
commonwealth.” (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XVI, pt. I)).
46. See Smith, supra note 22, at 39 (“The separate development of the law in each
of the states has been with ‘no particular aim or plan’ and has exacerbated the inherent
inconsistencies in the law of defamation” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 772 (5th ed. 1984))); see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra, at 771 (“[T]here is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense.”).
47. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (classifying
defamation as a class of utterances that bear “no essential part in the exposition of ideas”);
see also Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266 (holding that libelous utterances are not “within the
area of constitutionally protected speech”).
48. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254–55 (1964).
49. Id. at 256–57.
50. Id. at 258–59 (“It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the
two paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery.
Although Negro students staged a demonstration on the State Capitol steps, they sang the
National Anthem and not ‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee.’ Although nine student s were
expelled by the State Board of Education, this was not for leading the demonstration at the
Capitol, but for demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County
Courthouse on another day. . . . Although the police were deployed near the campus in
large numbers on three occasions, they did not at any time ‘ring’ the campus, and they
were not called to the campus in connection with the demonstration on the State Capitol
steps, as the third paragraph implied.”).
51. Id. at 258.
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and thus left the jury to determine compensatory and punitive damages.52
Although Alabama law permitted a jury to award punitive damages only
if it found that the publisher acted with malice, the trial judge refused to
charge the jury with that standard and failed to order the jury to differentiate
between general compensatory damages and punitive damages.53 The jury
returned a guilty verdict and awarded Sullivan a whopping $500,000.00
damages award—the highest libel award amount in Alabama history at
the time.54 The Alabama state appellate courts also ruled in favor of Sullivan.55
At the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices ruled unanimously in the
newspaper’s favor.56 Drawing from the common law of numerous states
and the works of legal scholars,57 the Court held that for a public official
like Sullivan to recover damages in a libel suit against the press when the
libel relates to their official conduct, the official would need to prove that
the publisher acted with “actual malice,” meaning that the information
was published with “knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.”58 This legal standard proved critical for
the freedom of the press to report on national news and for the Civil Rights
Movement as it prevented segregationists from stonewalling unfavorable
news coverage via lawsuits.59
52. Id. at 262.
53. Id.
54. David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on
Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 504 (2001).
55. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 263.
56. Id. at 264.
57. Id. at 279–80 (citing Ponder v. Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67, 80 (N.C. 1962); Lawrence
v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 725 (Mich. 1959); Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 340 P.2d
396, 400–01 (Kan. 1959); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass’n., 27 S.E.2d 837, 844 (W. Va.
1943); Salinger v. Cowles, 191 N.W. 167, 174 (Iowa 1922); Snively v. Rec. Publ’g Co.,
198 P. 1, 5–6 (Cal. 1921); McLean v. Merriman, 175 N.W. 878, 880 (S.D. 1920); Phx.
Newspapers v. Choisser, 312 P.2d 150, 154 (Ariz. 1957); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co.,
203 N.W. 974, 975 (Minn. 1925); Chagnon v. Union-Leader Corp., 174 A.2d 825, 833
(N.H. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 830 (1962); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES,
JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.26, at 449–50 (1956); Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public
Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 891–95, 897, 903 (1949); John E.
Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEX. L. REV. 41, 61 (1929); Jeremiah Smith, Are Charges Against the
Moral Character of a Candidate for an Elective Office Conditionally Privileged?, 18
MICH. L. REV. 1, 115 (1919); George Chase, Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates
for Office, 23 AM. L. REV. 346, 367–71 (1889); THOMAS M. COOLEY & VICTOR H. LANE,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 616–28 (7th ed. 1903). But see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 598 (AM. L. INST. 1938) (reversing the position taken in
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 1041(2) (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936));
Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419 (1910).
58. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.
59. See id. at 300–01 (“The opinion of the Court conclusively demonstrates the
chilling effect of the Alabama libel laws on First Amendment freedoms in the area of race
relations. The American Colonists were not willing, nor should we be, to take the risk that
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Nearly a decade later the Court would decide another major case in
defamation law that limited another jury award related to private
plaintiffs.60 When the family of a young man who was shot and killed by
a Chicago police officer hired attorney Elmer Gertz to sue the officer in a
wrongful death civil suit, an anti-communist magazine published a story
accusing Gertz of having a criminal record and of being a part of a
communist conspiracy to undermine the police.61 Although the jury returned
a verdict for Gertz in his defamation per se claim, the district court and
court of appeals ruled that the actual malice standard applied and, because
Gertz failed to show that the magazine published the statements with
actual malice, the outcome was a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
for the magazine. 62 The libel suit eventually made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, where the magazine argued that they should be afforded
the New York Times actual malice standard of proof required for defamation
cases involving public officials63 or public figures.64
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held in a 5–4 decision that,
as long as states did not impose strict liability, the individual states could
‘men who injure and oppress the people under their administration [and] provoke them to
cry out and complain’ will also be empowered to ‘make that very complaint the foundation
for new oppressions and prosecutions.’. . . Our national experience teaches that repressions
breed hate and ‘that hate menaces stable government.’” (first quoting The Trial of John
Peter Zenger, 17 Howell’s State Trials 675, 721–22 (1735); then quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); see also Weekend
Edition Sunday, Revisiting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, NPR, at 2:23 (Feb. 24, 2019,
8:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/24/697481372/revisiting-new-york-times-co-vsullivan [https://perma.cc/9RXG-JKWR] (“It went beyond saying that the newspaper was
not defamatory and, actually, recognized for the first time that there was a significant First
Amendment interest that was at play in these types of cases—this necessity of a robust,
public debate about the people and the policies of our government . . . . The [Supreme
Court] said the Constitution protects news organizations who are reporting on public
officials, even if they make errors, as long as the media aren’t being reckless or knowingly
spreading falsehoods.”).
60. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
61. Id. at 325–27.
62. See id. at 328–30 (“Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, the
District Court concluded that the New York Times standard should govern this case even
though petitioner was not a public official or public figure. It accepted respondent’s
contention that that privilege protected discussion of any public issue without regard to the
status of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court entered judgment for respondent
notwithstanding the jury’s verdict. This conclusion anticipated the reasoning of a plurality
of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).”).
63. Id. at 327–28.
64. Id. at 328.
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define “the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood” that injures a private individual and whose
“substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.”65 Crucially,
the Court also held that the common law rule permitting recovery of presumed
or punitive damages was unconstitutional against a media defendant,
related to a matter of public concern, unless the private plaintiff was able
to show that the defendant acted with actual malice.66 This resulted in
limiting private plaintiffs’ recovery to “actual injury” to their reputation
against a media defendant in a matter related to public concern, doing away
with the traditional common law rule that permitted recovery without
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff.67 This holding was a monumental
rejection of the common law rule permitting presumed damages in a broad
scope of defamation cases. As Justice White lamented in his dissent:
Lest there be any mistake about it, the changes wrought by the Court’s decision
cut very deeply . . . . No longer will the plaintiff be able to rest his case with
proof of a libel defamatory on its face or proof of a slander historically actionable
per se. . . . The Court rejects the judgment of experience that some publications
are so inherently capable of injury, and actual injury so difficult to prove, that the
risk of falsehood should be borne by the publisher, not the victim. Plainly, with
the additional burden on the plaintiff of proving negligence or other fault, it will
be exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible, for him to vindicate his reputation
interest by securing a judgment for nominal damages, the practical effect of such
a judgment being a judicial declaration that the publication was indeed false.
Under the new rule the plaintiff can lose, not because the statement is true, but
because it was not negligently made.68

C. Defamation for Private Plaintiffs Involving Private Speech
While New York Times and Gertz ushered in unprecedented constitutional
limitations on state defamation law on matters of public concern,69 the
Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders in 1985 proved that the First Amendment did not completely

65. Id. at 347–48 (citing Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)
(extending the New York Times standard to public figures)).
66. Id. at 349.
67. See id. at 349–50 (“In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts
awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to
the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish
expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion
to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship,
but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that
justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions.”).
68. Id. at 371–76 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Logan, supra note 54, at 507.
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abrogate state common law.70 The case arose in 1976 Vermont when a
seventeen-year-old high school student working for a credit-reporting
agency mistakenly identified a construction contractor’s company as having
filed for bankruptcy on a report to the agency’s subscribers.71 Although
the agency issued a correction, the contractor sued the agency for defamation
per se because the false report damaged its reputation.72 While issuing the
jury instructions, the trial court charged the jury to only award presumed
or punitive damages if it found that the agency acted with actual malice,
but provided various definitions not aligned with the New York Times
definition.73 The jury awarded a judgment of $50,000.00 in compensatory
or presumed damages and $300,000.00 in punitive damages in favor of
the contractor.74 On appeal, the agency argued that Gertz applied to the
case and that the award was unconstitutional because the trial court awarded
presumed and punitive damages on a lesser showing than actual malice.75
Thus, the question posed to the Court was whether Gertz should apply to
non-media defendants when the defamatory material is about private plaintiffs
and does not concern a matter of public or general interest.76
According to the Court, the answer was no, Gertz did not apply.77 The
Court reminded the agency that speech on matters of purely private concern
receives less First Amendment protection than speech on matters of public
concern.78 Unlike in Gertz, where “the state interest in awarding presumed
and punitive damages was not ‘substantial’ in view of their effect on speech
at the core of First Amendment concern,” the Court stated that the state
interest was substantial in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., given the purely private
nature of the speech and the rationale of the common law rule that “proof
70. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 743, 757–58 (1985).
71. Id. at 751–52.
72. Id. at 752.
73. Id. at 753–55.
74. Id. at 752.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 757.
77. Id. at 763.
78. Id. at 759 (“The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’. . .
‘[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment.’ Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues
occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to
special protection.” (first quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); then
quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964); and then quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))).
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of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the
character of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is
all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.”79 Thus, the Court’s
plurality held that “permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in
defamation cases absent a showing of ‘actual malice’ does not violate the
First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters
of public concern.”80 This decision effectively narrowed the Gertz ruling
and permitted the states to decide the applicable standard in defamation
per se cases involving private plaintiffs seeking presumed damages.
III. DEFAMATION PER SE IN THE PRIVATE PARTY CONTEXT
A. Defamation Overview: Per Quod and Per Se
For the purposes of this Article, this essentially brings us to the current
landscape of private plaintiff defamation law in the United States.81 While
79. Id. at 760–61 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, § 112, at 765 (4th ed. 1971)).
80. Id. at 763.
81. More recently, corresponding with the advent of the internet, courts began to
grapple with whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should be held liable for
defamatory content posted on their websites. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 147
(1959) (insulating bookstores from liability for defamatory content published in written
materials provided by their business). In 1991, the Southern District of New York held in
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., that service providers were immune from defamation
suits for content posted by users. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 135,
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). However, a few years later in 1995, a New York state court held
that an ISP of an online bulletin board was liable for defamatory statements made by third
party users where that specific ISP had several moderator functions in place. Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *3–7 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995). Recognizing the potential impact differing court decisions would have
on the growth of the Internet, Congressman Chris Cox (R-CA) spearheaded a bi-partisan
campaign with Congressman Ron Wyden (D-OR) to address this issue. Chris Cox,
Policing the Internet: A Bad Idea in 1996—and Today, REALCLEAR POLS. (June 25, 2020),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/06/25/policing_the_internet_a_bad_idea
_in_1996_—_and_today.html [https://perma.cc/23Y6-V9AC]. Thus, in 1996 Congress
passed § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, adopting the Cubby, Inc. court’s
holding shielding ISPs from user-generated content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). The rise
of the Internet also brought an increase in international communication, bringing the
American common law and the First Amendment into conflict with the United Kingdom’s
ancient defamation laws. In 2003, Khalid Bin Mahfouz sued American author Rachel
Ehrenfeld in a United Kingdom court for libel for accusing him and his family of funding
Islamic terrorist groups. David Pallister, US Author Mounts ‘Libel Tourism’ Challenge,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2007, 8:03 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/
15/books.usa [https://perma.cc/D2UU-CXA8]. Dr. Ehrenfeld asserted that the libel action
violated her U.S. First Amendment right because the statements made in her book would
not constitute libel in the United States and accordingly chose not to defend the suit in the
United Kingdom. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641, 2006 WL 1096816 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 26, 2006). After the U.K. court ruled in favor of Mahfouz, Dr. Ehrenfeld countersued
in New York to block the judgment’s enforcement. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542,
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most historical focus on defamation law analyzes the battles between the
press and public officials, each state’s common law maintains civil
defamation causes of action for private individuals. 82 Since the early
Republic and until New York Times, states developed their own case law
on defamation claims, resulting in the often-described “intellectual wasteland”
facing legal observers today.83 Nevertheless, the cornerstone of this common
law was developed to protect American society’s “pervasive and strong
interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”84
There are traditionally two types of defamation: per quod and per se.
Defamation per quod is a defamatory statement that is not harmful “on its
face” and requires a plaintiff to prove actual damages to their reputation
and monetary loss to make their claim actionable and to recover any
damages.85 Libel per quod acquires a defamatory meaning only in light
of extrinsic facts known by the recipient.86 “Further, unlike a plaintiff suing
on account of libel per se, the victim of libel per quod usually must plead
and prove special damages.”87 Defamation per se, on the other hand, is a
defamatory statement “so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff
that injury to the plaintiff’s reputation may be presumed.”88 The traditional
four89 categories of statements classified as defamation per se are: 1)
545 (2d Cir. 2007). When the New York courts eventually held that they lacked personal
jurisdiction over Bin Mahfouz, id. at 542, the New York State Legislature preemptively
passed the Libel Terrorism Protection Act—Rachel’s Law—in 2008, granting New
Yorkers protection against foreign libel judgments. Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 2008
N.Y. Laws 66 (codified at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2008). Soon after, the federal
government adopted its own version of Rachel’s Law when President Barack Obama
signed the Securing and Protecting our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage
(SPEECH) Act in 2010. 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105 (2018). See also Vincent R. Johnson,
Comparative Defamation Law: England and the United States, 24 U. MIA. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2017) (discussing the U.K.’s adoption of the Defamation Act of
2013, section 9, which limits causes of actions under related to recognition of English
defamation judgments).
82. See, e.g., Andrew Bossory, Defamation Per Se: Be Prepared to Plead (and Prove!)
Actual Damages, BUS. TORTS & UNFAIR COMPETITION , Spring 2014 at 11–15 (2014).
83. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and
the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 691 (1986); see also Smith, supra note 22, at 39.
84. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
85. Palm Springs Tennis Club v. Rangel, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 76 (Ct. App. 1999).
86. 5 PAUL M. DEUTCH & FREDERICK A. RAFFA, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 45.02(c).
87. Id.
88. Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1998).
89. But see Solaia Tech., L.L.C. v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 839 (Ill.
2006) (“In Illinois, there are five categories of statements that are considered defamatory
per se: (1) words that impute a person has committed a crime; (2) words that impute a
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involvement in criminal activity, 2) contraction of a loathsome, contagious,
or infectious disease,90 3) involvement in any sexual misconduct, or 4) an
inability to comport with character and fitness requirements of their
profession.91 In the vast majority of cases, actual malice is presumed in
defamation per se claims involving private plaintiffs and matters of
private concern.92
person is infected with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute a person
is unable to perform or lacks integrity in performing her or his employment duties; (4)
words that impute a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person in her or his
profession; and (5) words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication.”);
W. T. Farley, Inc. v. Bufkin, 132 So. 86, 87 (Miss. 1931); Goodwin v. Kennedy, 552 S.E.2d 319,
322–23 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
90. Although accusing someone of contracting a loathsome disease is still valid in
every state that retains the per se categories, there “are very few American cases applying
this category. The diseases considered loathsome have tended to be limited to venereal
diseases such as syphilis or gonorrhea, and leprosy.” SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 7:17. But
see Cohen v. Meyers, No. X04HHDCV115038794S, 2015 WL 8487861, at *8–9, *28
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2015) (awarding a man $100,000.00 in compensatory damages
after a disgruntled contractor accused him of cheating on his wife and contractin g a
“venereal disease”).
91. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 7:9.
92. See Spencer v. Spencer, 479 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1991) (“Libel per se means
the statements are actionable in and of themselves without proof of malice, falsity or
damage.”). Compare, e.g., Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 108 P.3d 787, 798
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“We hold that under Dun & Bradstreet, where no matters of public
concern are involved, presumed damages to a private plaintiff for defamation without
proof of actual malice may be available.”), Fountain v. First Reliance Bank, 730 S.E.2d
305, 309 (S.C. 2012) (“If the statement is actionable per se, then the defendant ‘is
presumed to have acted with common law malice and the plaintiff is presumed to have
suffered general damages.’” (quoting Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, L.L.C., 629 S.E.2d
653, 664 (S.C. 2006)), Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587, 593 (Me. 1993) (stating that
in per se claims, malice is implied as a matter of law), and Goldsmith v. Unity Indus. Life
Ins. & Sick Benefit Ass’n, 128 So. 182, 182 (La. Ct. App. 1930) (“Since such statements
as are charged to have been made, if actually made, are slanderous per se, it is not
necessary that actual malice be shown.”), with Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 763 A.2d 209,
245 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (stating that if the statement is defamatory per se, damages
are presumed when a plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice, by clear and convincing
evidence, even in the absence of proof of harm, whereas a statement defamatory per se
made with mere negligence requires the plaintiff to prove actual damages).
When the Gertz Court held that the private plaintiff has to show actual malice to recover
presumed damages, punitive damages, or both, it was understood at the time to broadly
invalidate Wisconsin and South Carolina-esque common law. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328, 334 (1974); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621(b)
(AM . L. INST. 1976) (“Though the action in the Gertz case was one of libel and the
defendant would be classified within the term, news media, and the defamatory statement
involved a matter of public concern, there is little reason to conclude that the constitutional
limitation on recoverable damages will be confined to these circumstances. The rationale
that a state has no substantial interest in securing for a plaintiff ‘gratuitous awards of
money damages far in excess of any actual injury’ seems fully applicable to a slander
action against a private defendant. Even if the application of the Gertz holding as a

656

58-3_KRIEGER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 641, 2021]

9/19/2021 9:07 AM

Defamation and Minimum Damage Awards
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

B. The Patchwork of Defamation Damages
The traditional categories of damages that one may recover from a
defamation action are 1) nominal; 2) punitive or exemplary; and 3) compensatory
or actual, which can largely be broken down into a) special and b) general
damages.93
1. Nominal Damages
Nominal damages must be given at least where the published statement
is actionable per se and the plaintiff prevails, but can be limited to amounts
such as “six cents or one dollar.”94 For example, nominal damages may
be awarded when the plaintiff’s bad character leads the trier of fact to
believe that no substantial harm has been done to their reputation and there
is no proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant’s attack upon
the plaintiff’s character and reputation.95 Such an award serves as a “judicial
declaration that the plaintiff’s right has been violated.”96 It vindicates the
plaintiff’s character through a verdict which establishes the falsity of the
defamatory statement.97
2. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are “not aimed at compensation, but at punishment
and deterrence”98 in response to action deemed reprehensible by the trier
of fact.99 The holding in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. distinguished First Amendment
protections between private speech and public speech by holding that
states may permit the recovery of punitive damages even if actual malice
constitutional decision should eventually be limited in some respects, so that it does
not apply, for example, to a private slander, it seems unlikely that the common law of the
States would apply a different test as to the damages that could be recovered.”). But in
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the plurality made clear that the
traditional common law rule could survive constitutional muster within the private v.
private context. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985).
93. KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, § 116A, at 842; SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:52.
94. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:5; see also Stidham v. Wachtel, 21 A.2d 282, 282
(Del. Super. Ct. 1941).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620(a) (AM. L. INST. 1976).
96. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:7 n.1.
97. Id. § 9:7.
98. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:36.
99. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974)).
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is not present.100 As such, “punitive damages are available as a matter of
constitutional law without regard to fault levels” and are now “purely a
matter of state law.”101 “Traditionally, state courts permitt[ed] punitive damages
in defamation actions only if . . . the defendant [was] guilty of publishing
with common law malice, in the sense of spite, ill will, or vengeance.”102
3. Compensatory or Actual Damages
While nominal and punitive damages enjoy almost universal definitions
and court usage, the definition and categorization of compensatory103 or
actual damages,104 including the various sub-categories, are not consistently
applied by courts or legal secondary sources.105 According to Smolla’s The
Law of Defamation, compensatory damages can generally be broken down
between special damages—pecuniary, monetary, and injury—and general
damages, including proof of actual reputational damages, emotional damages,

100. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
101. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:38.
102. Id. at § 9:43. But see Ciecierski v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 572 So. 2d 834,
834 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that punitive damages are not allowed in Louisiana for
defamation claims), writ denied, 574 So. 2d 1256 (1991).
103. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:11 (“In the law of defamation, compensatory damages
is not a specific category or term of art as such. The word ‘compensatory’ in a nontechnical
descriptive sense merely refers to all damages designed to compensate for injury, rather
than those damages that are ‘punitive,’ i.e., designed to punish the defendant.”).
104. Actual damages are classified as “real losses flowing from the defamatory
statement.” W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1154 (2012) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note
46, § 116A, at 843). It “is not limited to out-of-pocket loss,” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, but
includes “impairment of reputation and standing in the community,” along with personal
humiliation, mental anguish, and suffering to the extent that they flow from the
reputational injury. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:24. Contained within the notion of actual
damages is the doctrine of presumed damages—the losses “which are normal and usual
and are to be anticipated when a person’s reputation is impaired.” KEETON ET AL., supra
note 46, § 116A, at 843 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
105. See S MOLLA , supra note 17, § 9:4 (“The tendency to misuse terms in the
damages area, though perhaps not as egregious as in the area of the per se and per quod
rules, is nonetheless a recurring problem. The various categories of damages should thus
be referred to with reasonable attention and precision. Courts may thus refer to
‘compensatory’ or ‘actual’ damages, ‘nominal’ damages, ‘general’ damages, ‘special’ damages,
or ‘punitive’ or ‘exemplary’ damages.”); see also, e.g., Van Poole v. Nippu Jiji Co., 34
Haw. 354, 357 (1937) (“General damages are such as the law implies and presumes to
have occurred from the wrong complained of. The term ‘general damages’ is sometimes
synonymous with ‘actual damages.’”). “It always connotes ‘compensatory damages.’”
Van Poole, 34 Haw. at 357. “In the law of libel where the defamatory language is libelous per
se general damages are such as naturally, proximately and necessarily result from the
publication complained of (citation omitted) and include those which will compensate the
person defamed for ‘the injury to his reputation, business, and feelings which the defamatory
publication caused.’” Van Poole, 34 Haw. at 357 (quoting Palmer v. Mahin, 120 F. 737,
741 (8th Cir. 1903)).
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and “presumed” reputational damages that do not require proof of monetary
damages.106 For the purposes of this Article, special damages, actual
reputational injury, and actual emotional well-being injury will be referred
to as “hard” compensatory damages while presumed damages will be
referred to as “soft” compensatory damages.
a. Special Damages
Special damages, or “special harm,” consist of injury of a pecuniary or
monetary loss.107 These special damages may include “any injury of financial
value to the plaintiff,” but a plaintiff’s mental distress, even with a physical
illness, is insufficient.108 Examples of special damages include the loss of
customers, business, a specific contract, earnings, credit, or employment.109
However, special damages do not include the loss of social contacts or
friends unless these social losses are connected to financial injury.110 To
prove special damages, when damages are not presumed, the plaintiff must
connect the reputational injury to specific financial loss.111
b. General Damages
As special damages include monetary loss, general damages include
compensatory damages other than monetary losses.112 Types of general
damages include damage to reputation113 and emotional or mental damages.114
General damages include: (1) “actual damages,” with supporting evidence, to
a plaintiff’s reputation and emotional or mental well-being,115 and (2)
106. SMOLLA supra note 17, § 9:12.
107. Id. at § 9:35.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 622 (AM. L. INST. 1938) (“One who is
liable either for a libel or for a slander actionable per se is also liable for any special harm
of which the defamatory publication is the legal cause.”).
112. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:13.
113. Id. § 9:14; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1938)
(In defamation actions general damages “are imposed for the purpose of compensating the
plaintiff for the harm which the defamatory publication is proved, or, in the absence
of proof, is assumed to have caused to his reputation.”).
114. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:14; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (AM.
L. INST. 1938).
115. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:22 (consisting of general damages other than pecuniary
loss).
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“presumed damages,” that exist as a matter of law and do not require
evidence to support the amount of financial damages.116
1. Actual Reputation Injury
Whether a plaintiff is required to prove actual reputational injury
depends on the controlling standard. For cases under the Gertz negligence
standard, which deal with private figure plaintiffs involving matters of
public concern but where the plaintiff is unable to prove actual malice, the
plaintiff is required to prove actual reputational injury.”117 In contrast, for
cases under the Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. standard, which deal with private
figure plaintiffs and no matters of public concern where the plaintiff was
able to prove actual malice, the plaintiff is not required to prove actual
reputational injury.118 “Actual damages are thus damages established by
evidentiary proof, but of a nonpecuniary nature.”119 Unlike special damages
that often contain discrete dollar amounts, the dollar amounts for actual
reputational injury are often subjective based on the testimony about the
plaintiff’s reputation from witnesses at trial.120
2. Actual Emotional Well-Being Injury121
In Gertz the Supreme Court required only that actual harm be supported
by proof.122 As such, if the plaintiff could prove emotional or mental
harm, the plaintiff could recover for this more subjective harm.123 The more
common types of actual harm in defamation cases include “impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering.”124 After the Gertz decision, which permitted
the recovery of emotional or mental harm, the courts developed two ways

116. Id. § 9:14.
117. Id. § 9:23 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)); see
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, § 116A, at 843 (“In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the
Supreme Court held the common law rule that harm to reputation from the publication of
a libel was presumed to be incompatible with the First Amendment . . . unless the plaintiff
proves that the defamatory publication was made with knowledge of its falsity, or recklessly
with regard to the truth or falsity of the statement.”).
118. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:23.
119. Id. § 9:22.
120. Id.
121. See generally id. § 9:24 (explaining that mental or emotional harm constitutes
actual harm).
122. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (“[A]ll awards must be supported by competent evidence
concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar
value to the injury.”).
123. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:24.
124. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
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to address this harm. Some decisions required emotional or mental harm
damages only “parasitically,” when the plaintiff was able to prove reputational
injury; but other decisions permitted evidence of emotional or mental
harm to be sufficient by itself to recover actual damages, even if the
plaintiff did not suffer reputational injury. 125 In reviewing an award of
damages to compensate a plaintiff for emotional distress, courts may
consider such factors as the nature, duration, and severity of the plaintiff’s
mental anguish, and may consider the magnitude of disruption to the
plaintiff’s life, but the evidence has to exceed mere or modest “worry,
anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.”126
3. Presumed Damages Without Proof of Actual Financial Injury
The most unique form of compensatory damages are presumed damages
because the plaintiff is not required to provide any evidence of actual
financial loss.127 In other words, “the plaintiff is relieved of the necessity
of producing any proof whatsoever that he has been injured.”128 Instead,
the trier of fact may “presume” that reputational injury caused financial
loss simply due to the defendant’s publication of the defamatory content.129
While the presumption of damages creates an invitation for “arbitrariness,”
the courts have tried to ensure that these presumed damages “serve the
social policy of compensation.” 130 Accordingly, “courts for centuries

125. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:24.
126. Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 618–19 (Tex. 2018) (“A damages award
for mental anguish will survive a legal-sufficiency challenge when the record bears ‘direct
evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of the plaintiff’s mental anguish, thereby
establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiff’s daily routine,’ or when the record
demonstrates ‘evidence of a high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere
worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.’” (quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff,
901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)).
127. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:17.
128. Id. (quoting Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of Damages for Defamation,
12 N.C. L. REV. 120, 127 (1934)); W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1154 (N.J. 2012) (citing
SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:17) (“Presumed damages are a procedural device which permits a
plaintiff to obtain a damage award without proving actual harm to his reputation .”);
Freeman Holdings of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Does, No. CV-11-01877, 2013 WL 210810 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 18, 2013) (presumed damages must serve social policy of compensation) (quoting
SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:17 (“[C]ourts . . . impos[e] as the guiding principle the notion
that presumed damages must serve the social policy of compensation.”)).
129. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 9:17.
130. Id.
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have allowed juries to presume that some damage occurred from many
defamatory utterances and publications.”131
IV. LANDSCAPE OF PRESUMED DAMAGES DOCTRINE POST-DUN &
BRADSTREET, INC. AND THE WIDE RANGE OF PRESUMED
DAMAGE AWARDS FOR PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
As discussed above, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. permits states to grant
presumed damages when defamation involves a private figure and not a
matter of public concern.132 Forty states follow the traditional common
law rule that soft compensatory damages are presumed for plaintiffs
seeking recovery from defamation per se claims.133 The forty states that
131. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61
(1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 568 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1938) (noting
that Hale announced that damages were to be presumed for libel as early as 1670)).
132. Id. at 763.
133. See MacDonald v. Riggs, 166 P.3d 12, 18 (Alaska 2007); Tanner v. Ebbole, 88
So. 3d 856, 863 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092, 1095–96 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986); Gilman v. McClatchy, 111 Cal. 606, 613 (1896). In California, “libel per
se” is also known as “libel on its face.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (“A libel which is defamatory
of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement,
innuendo, or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face.”). See also Williams v.
Dist. Ct., 866 P.2d 908, 911 (Colo. 1993); Colo. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. 22:25 (3d ed.
2017); Lyons v. Heid, No. CV 940311175S, 1998 WL 309797, at *15 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 29, 1998); Stidham v. Wachtel, 21 A.2d 282, 282 (Del. Super. Ct. 1941); Harmon v.
Liss, 116 A.2d 693, 696 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1955); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Brown, 66 So.
2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1953); John D. Robinson Corp. v. S. Marine & Indus. Supply Co., 396
S.E.2d 837, 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Van Poole v. Nippu Jiji Co., 34 Haw. 354,
358 (1937); Barlow v. Int’l Harvester Co., 522 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Idaho 1974); MauvaisJarvis v. Wong, 987 N.E.2d 864, 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Stanley v. Kelley, 422 N.E.2d
663, 668–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 455 (Iowa 2013);
Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Ky. 2014); Shapiro v. Massengill, 661
A.2d 202, 217 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Simons v. Burnham, 60 N.W. 476, 480 (Mich.
1894); Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987);
McFadden v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 766 So. 2d 20, 24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000); Keller v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 108 P.2d 605, 612 (Mont. 1940); Hutchens v. Kuker, 96 N.W.2d
228, 232 (Neb. 1959); Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 138 P.3d 433, 448 (Nev. 2006); Lassonde v.
Stanton, 956 A.2d 332, 341–42 (N.H. 2008); NuWave Inv. Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co.,
75 A.3d 1241, 1252–53 (N.J. 2013); Arnold v. Sharpe, 251 S.E.2d 452, 455 (N.C. 1979);
Johnson v. Nielsen, 92 N.W.2d 66, 68–69 (N.D. 1958). According to the North Dakota
Central Code Section 14-02-04, North Dakota defines slander as what common law would
consider the four defamation per se categories and considers libel a separate cause of
action. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-04; see also Johnson, 92 N.W.2d at 68–69; N.D. Cent.
Code § 14-02-03; 35 OHIO JUR. 3d. Defamation and Privacy § 5 (2020) (citing Gosden v.
Louis, 687 N.E.2d 481, 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)); Mitchell v. Griffin Television, L.L.C.,
60 P.3d 1058, 1066 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); Benassi v. Georgia-Pacific, 662 P.2d. 760,
764 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)); 1 RONALD J. RESMINI, RHODE ISLAND TORT LAW AND PERSONAL
INJURY PRACTICE § 434(a) (citing Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 102 (R.I. 1909)) (in
case of “libel and slander . . . pecuniary damage is presumed”); Kunst v. Loree, 817 S.E.2d
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keep the common law rule either allow private plaintiffs to recover soft
damages134 or, where there is no proof of actual reputational harm, entitle
plaintiffs to only nominal damages. 135 The Hawaii Supreme Court aptly
articulated the rationale in support of presumed damages in 1937:
The presumption that the victim of defamatory language libelous per se has
suffered general damages is not a mere fiction to be lightly disregarded. It is the
common experience of mankind that injury and resulting damage is the natural,
proximate and necessary result of libels which hold a subject “up to scorn and
ridicule and to feelings of contempt or execration, impair him in the enjoyment
of society and injure those imperfect rights of friendly intercourse and mutual
benevolence which man has with respect to man.”136

Meanwhile, ten states have extended Gertz’s rationale to its most restrictive
conclusion and abandoned the common law rule on presumed damages in
favor of requiring actual proof of damages for private plaintiffs seeking soft
compensatory damages.137 As explained by the Arkansas Supreme Court:
295, 306–07 (S.C. Ct. App. 2018); Walkon Carpet Corp. v. Klapprodt, 231 N.W.2d 370,
373–74 (S.D. 1975); Venn v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 47, 59 (M.D.
Tenn. 1962) (applying Tennessee law); Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex.
2014); Westmont Mirador, L.L.C. v. Miller, 362 P.3d 919, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 2014);
Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 636 S.E.2d 447, 450 (Va. 2006); Maison de France,
Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 108 P.3d 787, 791 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Milan v. Long, 88 S.E.
618, 619 (W. Va. 1916); Williams v. Hicks Printing Co., 150 N.W. 183, 188 (Wis. 1914);
McBride v. Peak Wellness Ctr., Inc., 688 F.3d 698, 711 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Hoblyn v.
Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1232–33 (Wyo. 2002)).
134. See, e.g., MacDonald, 166 P.3d at 18–19 (“Under Alaska law, general damages
for defamation per se may be awarded without any proof of damages. In City of Fairbanks
v. Rice, we noted that the superior court was correct in finding that statements that are
defamatory per se ‘obviat[e] the need for proof of damages.’ Similarly, in Alaska Statebank v.
Fairco this court upheld damages for a defamation case involving slander per se on the
basis that ‘[p]roof of actual damages was . . . not necessary to support the award.’ . . .
MacDonald’s defamation occurred in a very small town and involved serious allegations
against Riggs. Viewed in this context, Riggs’s testimony could enable a reasonable juror
to award damages on the basis that MacDonald’s statements harmed Riggs’s reputation
and standing in the community and caused him emotional distress.”).
135. See, e.g., Burbage, 447 S.W.3d at 259 (“Texas law presumes that defamatory
per se statements cause reputational harm and entitle a plaintiff to general damages such
as loss of reputation and mental anguish. But this presumption yields only nominal
damages.”) (citations omitted).
136. Van Poole, 34 Haw. at 358 (1937) (quoting Kahanamoku v. Advertiser Publ’g
Co., 25 Haw. 701, 713 (1920)).
137. See United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Murphy, 961 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Ark. 1998);
Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 141 (La. 2004); Zoeller v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 834
P.2d 391, 395 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 847 A.2d 1169,
1174 (Me. 2003); Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626 N.E.2d 862, 868 (Mass. 1994); Nazeri
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Among the problems inherent in presuming harm are the absence of criteria given
to juries to measure the amount the injured party ought to recover, the danger of
juries considering impermissible factors such as the defendant’s wealth or
unpopularity, and the lack of control on the part of trial judges over the size of
jury verdicts. [citation omitted]. Moreover, by allowing presumed damages for
certain words that fit within the per se categories but precluding actual damages
for other words without additional proof of damages, the common-law rule
‘creates unjustifiable inequities for plaintiffs and defendants alike.’ . . . We
believe that the better and more consistent rule . . . is to require plaintiffs to prove
reputational injury in all cases.138

A. Presumed Damages States
Damage awards for defamation per se lawsuits vary widely based on
jurisdiction and within the various per se categories. While “no two cases
are exactly the same,”139 a survey of damage awards illuminates the frustrating
uncertainty some plaintiffs face when attempting to recover compensation
for their damaged reputations. In 2017, a Texas martial arts instructor was
awarded $250,000.00 in damages for harm to his reputation and mental
anguish when his reputation was destroyed after a woman falsely accused
him of sexually abusing and possessing sexually explicit photos of children.140
But when a man in Iowa was falsely reported to his mother, pastor, and
the state protective services for, among other related conduct, molesting a
child, an Iowa jury only awarded him $25,000.00 in compensatory damages
in 2014.141 In Arizona, a 2000 court decision upheld a jury’s $100,000.00
presumed damages award in a case where a man was falsely accused of
molesting a young girl by her parents who reported him to the police and
communicated to the neighborhood.142 In Alaska, a 2007 court upheld an
award of $35,000.00 in reputational damages to a man whose ex-girlfriend
falsely accused him of holding her at gunpoint during and after she was
assaulted by another man.143

v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. 1993) (abolishing the distinction between
defamation per se and per quod and instead requiring proof of actual injury in every
defamation case); Smith v. Durden, 276 P.3d 943, 952 (N.M. 2012) (requiring proof of
actual injury in every defamation case ); Nolan v. State, 69 N.Y.S.3d 277, 283 (App. Div.
2018); Bakare v. Pinnacle Health Hosps., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 272, 298 (M.D. Pa. 2006)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162, 1169–70 (Vt. 1983).
138. United Ins., 961 S.W.2d at 756 (quoting Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 313).
139. Okraynets v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 555 F. Supp. 2d 420, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
140. Hawbecker v. Hall, 276 F. Supp. 3d 681, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (applying Texas
law, the court included $68,000.00 in lost wages and $100,000.00 in exemplary damages).
141. Burn v. Sinclair, No. 13-1505, 2014 WL 5243368, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.
15, 2014) (the jury also awarded him a $25,000.00 punitive award).
142. Schmitz v. Aston, 3 P.3d 1184, 1191, 1193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) depublished
by 18 P.3d 1230 (2001).
143. MacDonald v. Riggs, 166 P.3d 12, 14, 18–19 (Alaska 2007).

664

58-3_KRIEGER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 641, 2021]

9/19/2021 9:07 AM

Defamation and Minimum Damage Awards
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Per se reputational damage awards also vary widely within the imputation
of professional ability and honesty context. Examples of significant
reputational damages awards related to these types of per se claims include a
home builder in South Carolina who was awarded $1 million in actual damages
after a homeowner’s employee falsely made statements to a vendor and
subcontractor accusing the builder of stealing client funds, which seriously
injured the builder’s reputation.144 In 2019, a Texas attorney was awarded
$500,000.00 in compensatory damages for his reputation when opposing
clients defamed him online by accusing him of committing fraud and of
violating state professionalism rules for attorneys.145 In Nevada, a plastic
surgeon was awarded $250,000.00 in compensatory damages and $250,000.00
in punitive damages after a doctor lied to the surgeon’s patient that he had
killed someone who received the same surgery as the patient.146 A South
Carolina court upheld a $400,000.00 actual damages and $100,000.00
punitive damages award for a man whose former employer accused him
of being a “thief” for stealing a welding machine, resulting in the man not
being able to get work as a result of his tarnished reputation.147 A man in
California was awarded $400,001.00 after several people accused him of
committing embezzlement and engaging in “shady financial practices.”148
A Texas jury awarded a salesman $211,000.00 in compensatory damages
when his former employer made false comments about the salesman’s
performance and professional integrity.149 In another Texas case, a female
employee was awarded, inter alia, $175,000.00 in character and reputation
damages after the vice president of her former employer accused her of
prostituting herself to get business at a crawfish boil attended by attendees
of a conference.150 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $90,000.00
Minnesota jury award for the operator of a vacuum cleaner business who
was defamed by a vacuum cleaner manufacturer whose attorneys sent
144. Kunst v. Loree, 817 S.E.2d 295, 295, 300 (S.C. Ct. App. 2018).
145. Vodicka v. Tobolowsky, No. 05-17-00727-CV, 2019 WL 1986625, at *8 (Tex.
App. May 6, 2019).
146. Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 138 P.3d 433, 439 (Nev. 2006).
147. Constant v. Spartanburg Steel Prods., Inc., 447 S.E.2d 194, 194–97 (S.C. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1017 (1994).
148. Brisson v. Propane Studio L.L.C., No. CGC 13-531005, 2014 WL 12516224,
at *4, *8 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2014).
149. Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 617, 630 (Tex. App. 1984).
150. Fontenot Petro-Chem & Marine Servs. v. LaBono, 993 S.W.2d 455, 457, 460
(Tex. App. 1999) (the employee was also awarded her $60,000.00 award in lost income
and $30,000.00 for mental anguish).
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a letter falsely accusing the operator of selling used vacuum cleaners
as new.151
While the above-mentioned cases seem like good results for the plaintiffs,
not every defamation per se claim related to professional ability and honesty
results in a substantial reputational damages award. The following cases
are a sampling of the low end of the presumed reputational damages spectrum
for professional ability and honesty. A Texas court reduced a doctor’s
actual reputational damages to $25,000.00 when he was defamed by a
fellow doctor who accused him of being an incompetent physician, being
a liar, having low moral character, and coming to the hospital intoxicated
in front of patients and other doctors.152 In another Texas case, an inspector
received $55,000.00 in past and future damages to his reputation when a
disgruntled airplane owner accused him of breaking into his locked airplane.153
A New Hampshire contractor only received a $10,000.00 award in reputational
damages after dissatisfied customers claimed he built them a “sickly”
house to friends and neighbors in the state’s small business community.154
The Eastern District of Virginia reduced an attorney’s $24,000.00 award
in actual damages to a mere $6,000.00 when an author published several
false statements online “questioning Plaintiff’s ethical conduct as a practicing
attorney, accusing him of the criminal act of extortion, and stating that
Plaintiff had been discharged from his employment with a law firm as a
result of such conduct.”155 A Virginia jury awarded $10,000.00 in compensatory
damages to a motorcycle mechanic in 1996 after an acquaintance falsely
accused him of being a thief and a liar to his employer and to strangers at
a custom motorcycle show and restaurant.156 In Nevada, a court awarded
a woman $50,000.00 in reputational damage after her a man accused her
of committing adultery with another HOA member and engaging in
polygamy. 157 In Maryland, a woman who was falsely accused of being
criminally charged with harassment and owing money to a broadcast station

151. Scott Fetzer Co. v. Williamson, 101 F.3d 549, 553, 557 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying
Minnesota law).
152. Bayoud v. Sigler, 555 S.W.2d 913, 914, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (using the
term actual damages to mean reputational damages).
153. Peshak v. Greer, 13 S.W.3d 421, 423–24, 427 (Tex. App. 2000) (the jury also
awarded the inspector $48,500.00 in special damages that encompassed past and future
mental anguish and loss of earning capacity).
154. Lassonde v. Stanton, 956 A.2d 332, 337 (N.H. 2008).
155. Cretella v. Kuzminski, 640 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746–47 (E.D. Va. 2009) (applying
Virginia law).
156. Poulston v. Rock, 467 S.E.2d 479, 481 (Va. 1996) (also awarded $25,000.00 in
punitive damages).
157. Barraco v. Robinson, No. 72566-COA, 2019 WL 1932068, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App.
Apr. 26, 2019).
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by her ex-boyfriend’s jealous girlfriend only received $10,000.00.158
Lastly, in a 2011 Texas case, an attorney was awarded only $20,000.00 in
damages to his past and future reputation after he was falsely accused over
a radio-talk show of making sexually suggestive comments and exposing
a co-worker to pornography in the workplace.159
B. Actual Damages States
This wide range of damage awards demonstrates the gamble many
plaintiffs face when they are deciding whether to pursue a defamation per
se claim in presumed damages states. Nonetheless, plaintiffs in states that
require actual proof of damages face their own hurdle in achieving monetary
justice. Compare an Arkansas plaintiff in 1998 who was awarded
$600,000.00 in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages
against her former supervisor who falsely told clients that she was stealing
their insurance premiums160 with a Missouri man who was only awarded
$30,000.00 in reputational damages and a mere $25.00 in punitive damages
after he was accused of molesting a child through posters plastered throughout
his neighborhood.161 Similarly, in Louisiana, a court awarded a couple
$35,000.00 each in general damages after another neighborhood couple
accused them of molesting the couple’s four-year-old daughter during an
overnight stay in their home.162 In Maine, a solar home contractor only
received $20,000.00 in compensatory damages when a former customer
falsely told another homeowner/potential customer that the contractor was
a “drunk” and that his crew drank on job, left earlier each day, and eventually
failed to show up. 163 And yet, the reputational damage awards in the
above mentioned cases are many times that which was awarded to Theresa
Smith in 1993.164 Smith was a law student at the Southern University Law
School in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, who was taught by a first-year law

158. Harvey-Jones v. Coronel, 196 A.3d 36, 40–41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) (the
court also awarded her $200,000.00 in punitive damages).
159. Olson v. Westergren, No. 13-10-00054-CV, 2011 WL 3631963, at *1 (Tex.
App. Aug. 18, 2011).
160. United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Murphy, 961 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ark. 1998).
161. Kennedy v. Jasper, 928 S.W.2d 395, 397–98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
162. Connor v. Scroggs, 821 So. 2d 542, 546–47 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
163. Haworth v Feigon, 623 A.2d 150, 155–56 (Me. 1993).
164. Smith v. Atkins, 622 So. 2d 795, 796, 800 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
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professor.165 One day, in front of Smith’s class, the professor recounted
an incident where he witnessed Smith drunk at a nightclub and described
how she accidentally fell on the ground as she went to sit down.166 When
Smith asked why the professor did not help her up, he either responded
“‘I ain’t pickin’ no Slut up off the floo’ [sic] or an elaborate mock stagewhisper ‘Slut.’”167 According to the record, the news that the professor called
Smith a “slut” spread around the law school like “wildfire” and resulted
in Smith being the butt of many jokes by her peers.168 When Smith sued
the professor for libel, the trial court only awarded her $1,500.00 in
general damages to her reputation.169 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
in Louisiana thought the award was far too small and bumped the damages
up to a measly $5,000.00.170 For context, the Southern University Law
School is a small, local law school of close to 500 full-time students where
graduates mostly go on to work for the State of Louisiana.171 In the legal
field reputation is everything, so to be ridiculed and extremely embarrassed
by a law professor before even taking the bar exam could have been a
debilitating start to her career.172
Similar to the forty states that permit presumed damages, per se reputational
damage awards in actual damage states, especially for per se claims in the
category of professional ability and honesty, can be quite high. For example,
165. Id. at 796; Contact Us, S. UNIV. L. CTR., https://www.sulc.edu/page/prospectivestudents-contact-us-2 [https://perma.cc/53CE-SBN8].
166. Smith, 622 So. 2d at 796–97.
167. Id. at 797.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 799.
170. Id. at 800.
171. S. UNIV., STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.
sulc.edu/assets/sulc/ABADisclosures/ABA-509-Report-January-4-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N9EQ-WP6E]; S. UNIV., EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2019 GRADUATES (Apr. 25, 2020,
3:23 PM), https://www.sulc.edu/assets/sulc/CareerServices/2019-SULC-Employmentoutcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AWN-KPUV].
172. See Smith, 622 So. 2d at 797–98 (“Numerous students testified that after the
name-calling incident, they stopped associating with Theresa Smith. One student stated
that while she did not believe Professor Atkin’s allegation, the gossip became so bad that
if you associated with Theresa, other students would then target you as the but t of
their jokes and gossip. A student testified that she was head of the Moot Court Board and
a serious student who anticipated a serious and successful career in law and that she could
not afford to be associated with someone of low moral character, that it had the potential
of impacting negatively on her career. Another student testified that although he had never
thought that Theresa Smith was a slut, when the Professor called her that openly and in
class, he thought that there might be some basis to it—‘after all he was a Professor’—and
he began to wonder about Theresa. Another student testified that the incident would cause
him not to offer Theresa a partnership or a job if he were in a position to do so, because he
could not afford to have someone of questionable character affiliated with him professionally.
Other students thought that actively associating with Theresa would cause Professor Atkins to
retaliate with bad grades.”).
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take the New York case of Cantu v. Flanigan.173 Cantu involved a
Mexican businessman who had earned an international reputation of being
a man of integrity within the petroleum industry.174 Flanigan was also a
businessman and served as the president of a Bahamian corporation that,
over two decades, had filed multiple lawsuits against Mexican petroleum
workers unions.175 Believing that Cantu was connected with the Mexican
government, and somehow had the ability to assist with the settlement of
judgments from those lawsuits, Flanigan made several accusations against
Cantu to a reporter.176 Namely, he accused Cantu of managing a racketeering
enterprise, money laundering, bribery of government officials, being
involved with Mexican criminal cartels, being the head of a crime family,
oil smuggling, committing mail and wire fraud, “tampering, obstruction
of commerce, unlawful travel, theft by conversion and extortion,” and,
most outrageously, conspiring with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to
circumvent sanctions against Iraq and being personally responsible for
causing gasoline prices to rise.177
When the allegations were published in a globally circulated magazine,
Cantu lost business contracts, reported that he could no longer enter into
multi-million dollar contracts because of the damage to his reputation, and
even became subject to a criminal investigation by the Mexican government.178
After Cantu filed a defamation suit in New York, the jury awarded him
$150 million in compensatory damages for the harm to his reputation,
humiliation, and mental anguish.179 Although Flanigan appealed the award
amount, the Eastern District of New York sustained the award because (1)
Cantu “had a positive reputation throughout the petroleum industry and . . .
his reputation for honesty and fair business practice was recognized
throughout the world by his peers,” and “[t]he evidence . . . indicated that
[plaintiff’s] reputation enabled him to secure large, multi-million dollar
contracts”; (2) “the defendant’s statements were . . . inflammatory”; (3) “the
statements at issue . . . were circulated throughout the world”; (4) the statements
“addressed [plaintiff’s] professional reputation within the petroleum industry . . .
and were made such that they would appear to be coming from a credible
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Cantu v. Flanigan, 705 F. Supp. 2d 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 222.
Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225.
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source”; and (5) the defendant “engaged in a deliberate course of conduct
that can only be described as attempted criminal extortion.”180 This made
the award the largest approved defamation award in New York State
history.181
A second example is Hanna Bouveng’s lawsuit against her former
employer NYG Capital, LLC–NYG–in 2016.182 Bouveng was a Swedish
national who was studying at Berkeley College in New York City when
she accepted a job at NYG, a Wall Street investment firm in Manhattan.183
After over a year of unwanted sexual advances and intimidation, Bouveng
was fired for refusing to pursue a sexual relationship with her employer
Benjamin Wey, a major Wall Street figure.184 Soon afterwards, Wey sent
emails to Bouveng’s family and friends that he found her “naked, dirty,
[and] totally drunk” with a “homeless black man” in Bouveng’s bed, and
that she “par[ties] like crazy, is not hanging out with the right people, and
leads a double life.”185 Wey then published a series of articles in an online
publication accusing her of, inter alia, being a prostitute, attempting to blackmail
him, committing perjury, having drug and gun possession convictions,
committing bank fraud, and being in the United States illegally. 186
Bouveng testified that the top Google searches concerning her name were
images and headlines from the Wey articles.187 Because of Wey’s actions,
Bouveng lost friends and feared that she would be unable to get another
job, prompting her to move back to Sweden and work at a coffee shop.188
When Bouveng sued over Wey’s statements for defamation per se, the
jury awarded her $1.5 million in compensatory damages for her reputation
and emotional distress.189 On appeal to the Southern District of New York,
Wey and NYG argued in part that the compensatory damages award should
be reduced because, unlike in other high damages awards cases, Bouveng
was only at the outset of a professional career, so any reputational harm
would not be comparable to plaintiffs like Cantu.190 While the court
acknowledged that Bouveng was at the mere beginning of a career where
she was being groomed to take on the role of a marketing director for a

180. Id. at 228–29.
181. Id. at 230.
182. Bouveng v. NYG Capital L.L.C.,175 F. Supp. 3d 280, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(applying New York law).
183. Id. at 289–90.
184. Id. at 289, 291–301.
185. Id. at 301.
186. Id. at 303–07.
187. Id. at 307.
188. Id. at 308.
189. Id. at 335.
190. Id. at 342.
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Swedish life insurance company, it flatly rejected Wey and NYG’s
argument.191 The Court described the defendants’ actions as “carefully
and maliciously” designed to do “maximum damage to Plaintiff’s burgeoning
professional career,” and noted the disturbing precedent that could arise if
individuals or organizations with substantial resources could “destroy careers
before they can become well established” and were only liable to pre-career
reputational damages.192 Accordingly, the court upheld the compensatory
damages award.193
However, other defamation claims about a plaintiff’s alleged dishonesty
have resulted in far smaller awards. A bingo hall owner in Louisiana received
$50,000.00 in general reputational damages when a police officer falsely
accused him of “bilking” thousands of dollars from charities over the
years.194 Likewise, in Maine, a former vice president of sales and marketing
was also awarded $50,000.00 in compensatory damages after her employer
accused her of charging personal items to the company credit card.195 A
former employee at a Vermont distribution center was awarded $19,000.00
in compensatory reputational damages after his employer called him a thief
at a staff meeting when the former employee kept rejected merchandise.196
In Louisiana, a woman only received $15,000.00 in general damages after
her former employer accused her of embezzlement in a fax to the principals
of her new employer.197 A Louisiana plaintiff was only awarded $500.00
in reputational damages when he was evicted after his landlord’s relative
spread false rumors that he was being investigated for use and sale of
illegal drugs and that he hosted parties involving nudity, sex, and drug
use.198 And a New York man received a paltry $500.00 in reputational
damage after a video rental store displayed his name on the counter along

191. Id. at 342–43.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 344.
194. Trentecosta v. Beck, 714 So. 2d 721, 723–26 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (the court also
awarded him $94,357.50 in loss profits).
195. Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587, 589–93 (Me. 1993).
196. Crump v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 576 A.2d 441, 443–45, 448 (Vt. 1990) (the
jury also awarded him $25,000.00 in punitive damages and $19,000.00 in intentional
infliction of emotional distress damages).
197. Blades v. Olivier, 740 So. 2d 755, 756–57 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
198. See Lege v. White, 619 So. 2d 190, 190–91 (La. Ct. App 1993) (the court also
awarded him $5,000.00 in damages for mental anguish).
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with a sign indicating a $1,000.00 “reward” suggesting the plaintiff was a
thief.199
V. PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS NEED A GUARANTEED MINIMUM DAMAGE
AWARD TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESUMED DAMAGES
DOCTRINE HAS SUFFICIENT PRACTICAL VALUE
The wide range of awards demonstrates that while some plaintiffs will
be adequately compensated for the defamatory statements made about
their reputations, others will not.200 Indeed, even in cases where the plaintiff
receives a substantial jury award, higher courts can drastically reduce
reputational damage awards.201 While public plaintiffs, or wealthier private
plaintiffs, may be willing to take the litigation gamble, private plaintiffs
of more modest means do not have that luxury and are prohibited from
benefiting from the presumed damages associated with per se defamation
claims. As Justice White observed in his Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., concurrence,
“[g]eneral damages for injury to reputation were presumed and awarded
because the judgment of history was that ‘in many cases the effect of
defamatory statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible directly
to trace the effects thereof in loss to the person defamed.’”202 Even if the
plaintiff was awarded only nominal damages, the presumed damages rule
performed “a vindicatory function by enabling the plaintiff publicly to brand
the defamatory publication as false,” which allowed defamed persons to
“expose the groundless character of a defamatory rumor before harm to
the reputation . . . resulted therefrom.”203 The plurality further explained
that presuming damages in defamation per se cases “furthers the state interest
in providing remedies for defamation by ensuring that those remedies are
effective.”204

199. Gallo v. Montauk Video, Inc., 684 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (App. Term 1998).
200. Indeed, even in cases where the plaintiff receives a substantial jury award,
higher courts can drastically reduce reputational damage awards. See Cretella v. Kuzminski,
640 F. Supp. 2d 741, 741 (E.D. Va. 2009). See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness
or Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages for Defamation, 49 A.L.R. 4th (2020).
201. See, e.g., Cretella, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (applying Virginia law, the court
reduced plaintiff attorney’s jury award of $24,000.00 in actual damages in defamation
action to $6,000.00 where the plaintiff was defamed per se to the state legal ethics board).
See also Zitter, supra note 200.
202. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 (White,
J., concurring) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1938)).
203. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1938)).
204. Id. at 761; see also Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 64 (Tex. 2013)
(affirming this explanation).
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This proposition has been well supported by courts throughout the United
States. Decades before Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the Hawaii Supreme
Court explained the reputational harm associated with defamatory statements:
The presumption that the victim of defamatory language libelous per se has
suffered general damages is not a mere fiction to be lightly disregarded. It is the
common experience of mankind that injury and resulting damage is the natural,
proximate and necessary result of libels which hold a subject “up to scorn and
ridicule and to feelings of contempt or execration, impair him in the enjoyment
of society and injure those imperfect rights of friendly intercourse and mutual
benevolence which man has with respect to man.”205

Decades after Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court
highlighted the importance of presumed damages in the modern day:
In today’s world, one’s good name can too easily be harmed through publication
of false and defaming statements on the Internet. Indeed, for a private person
defamed through the modern means of the Internet, proof of compensatory damages
respecting loss of reputation can be difficult if not well-nigh insurmountable. . . .
In sum, private persons face the real risk of harm through the modern ease of
defamatory publications now possible through use of the Internet. Presumed
damages vindicate the dignitary and peace-of-mind interest in one’s reputation
that may be impaired through the misuse of the Internet. Permitting reputational
damages to be presumed in a defamation action arising in that setting serves a
legitimate interest, one that ought not be jettisoned from our common law. 206

The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that reputational harm was the result
of defamatory statements and observed that:
205. Van Poole v. Nippu Jiji Co., 34 Haw. 354, 358 (1937) (quoting Kahanamoku v.
Advertiser Publ’g Co., 25 Haw. 701, 713 (1920)).
206. W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1159–60 (N.J. 2012); see also id. at 1159
(“Justice O’Hern, in dissent, squarely addressed [the importance of the Presumed Damages
doctrine], declaring the plain and simple truth that out-of-pocket losses are not the only
damages a private plaintiff in a defamation action suffers. Other damages include the loss
of one’s good name inflicted by the defamatory publication to third parties, and the anguish
and humiliation that flows from a communication that, history and experience teach, will
diminish one’s good name.”) (citation omitted); Bouveng v. NYG Capital L.L.C., 175 F.
Supp. 3d 280, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“In the internet age in which we live, an individual’s
online presence is as important–perhaps more important early on–than her physical
presence.”); Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 455 (Iowa 2013) (“In our present-day
world, accusations can be spread quickly and inexpensively, through self-publishing of a
book or otherwise. A generation or two ago, it is entirely plausible that if [defendant] had
decided to write a memoir about his life, it would have stayed by his typewriter and never
been copied or distributed. Now, however, for a relatively modest price, it is possible to
print 250 copies of a professional-looking book alleging that one’s ex-wife is a victim of
child abuse from her father. We think libel per se plays a useful role in helping to keep
our social interactions from becoming ever more coarse and personally destructive.”).
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The harm resulting from an injury to reputation is difficult to demonstrate both
because it may involve subtle differences in the conduct of the recipients toward
the plaintiff and because the recipients, the only witnesses able to establish the
necessary causal connection, may be reluctant to testify that the publication
affected their relationships with the plaintiff. Thus some presumptions are
necessary if the plaintiff is to be adequately compensated. 207

Presumed damages in general are only allowed by the law when there
is a great likelihood of injury coupled with great difficulty in proving
damages.208 “In allowing the jury to presume damages where none have
been proven by concrete evidence, the law permits the jury to prevent an
injustice by awarding damages for injuries that are real but not quantifiable.”209
Although there is some scholarly work opposed to the idea of presumed
reputational damages, in part because there is no uniform way for a trier
of fact to value presumed damages,210 forty states still maintain presumed
reputational damages for plaintiffs.211 Therefore, instead of abolishing
this critical remedy, especially for modest means plaintiffs, as was done
for all plaintiffs in ten states, 212 a solution that is more consistent with
the intent of presumed damages would be for states to impose a minimum
recovery for presumed reputational damages for private plaintiffs related
to matters not of public concern. This solution also addresses the lack of
uniform valuation of presumed reputational damages.213
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court rightly acknowledged
that “proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases
where, from the character of the defamatory words and the circumstances
of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.”214
If providing actual proof is already “impossible” and courts already
presume that “serious harm has resulted,” then the next logical step is

207. Bierman, 826 N.W.2d at 454 (quoting Erwin N. Griswold, Developments in the
Law: Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 891–92 (1956)).
208. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310–11 (1986) (stating
that presumed damages compensate for harms that are impossible to measure).
209. Blaine Larsen Processing, Inc. v. Hapco Farms, Inc., No. 97-0212-E-BLW,
2000 WL 35539979, at *12 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2000).
210. See generally David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 749 (1984).
211. See supra note 133.
212. See supra note 137.
213. Admittedly, determining a minimum recovery, or “damages floor,” is not a
perfect solution and the process to determine the minimum dollar amount will contain a
level of subjectivity that will make some uncomfortable. However, once the floor is set,
all parties will have a more useful mechanism to evaluate the merits of plaintiff’s defamation
claim and the corresponding presumed damages.
214. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985)
(quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 765 (4th ed. 1971)).
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to provide plaintiffs with the reliable remedy of a guaranteed minimum
dollar amount.
Suppose a minimum wage employee is defamed per se by their manager
such that the employee has a valid per se claim in a matter not related to
public concern. Assuming this minimum wage employee even realizes
that a potential legal remedy exists and has the resources to retain counsel,
how is the employee or counsel supposed to adequately weigh the merits
of the litigation associated with the presumed damages? The employee
could easily spend $20,000.00 on litigation and obtain a presumed damages
award of $5,000.00. Without some type of minimum award, presumed
damages effectively operate as a legal fiction for many potential plaintiffs.
Opponents may argue that defamation per se is less damaging to a
minimum wage employee than a public official or a wealthy private plaintiff,
but defamation law provides recovery for hard damages215 and providing
a minimum damage award for presumed damages allows all plaintiffs,
regardless of their financial circumstances, to adequately evaluate their
legal claim and decide whether to seek legal remedies. As stated by an
Iowa Supreme Court Justice:
I believe the only way a defamed person can definitely vindicate his or her
reputation is to bring an action against the defamer. When a defamatory act gives
rise to a per se claim, we should not require the defamed person to prove damages
in order to vindicate his or her name.216

Further, if presumed damages are supposed to “vindicate the dignitary
and peace-of-mind interest in one’s reputation,”217 and defamation law
remains the only tort in American law where a plaintiff can recover damages
without proof of actual injury,218 then the state legislatures must provide
an equally unique remedy—a minimum financial damages award for
plaintiffs who successfully litigate a per se defamation claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
A right without a remedy is no right at all.219 The types of damages and
standards of proof in defamation cases vary greatly depending on the
215. See supra Section III.B.3. (discussing “hard” compensatory damages).
216. Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 467 (Iowa 2013) (Wiggins, J., concurring).
217. W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1160 (N.J. 2012).
218. Anderson, supra note 210, at 748.
219. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 130
(William Carey Jones ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1916) (1765–1770) (“For it is a settled
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plaintiff, the defendant, the intent, and even the type of statements.220 The
doctrine of presumed damages provides a much needed remedy for
plaintiffs that addresses an almost universal belief in our justice system—
reputational damages are real and very difficult, if not impossible, to fully
prove.221 As such, forty states have maintained the benefits of presumed
damages for plaintiffs.222 However, due to the wide spectrum of presumed
damage awards in case law,223 it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
adequately evaluate the merits of their defamation claim, which is especially
problematic for modest means plaintiffs who have been defamed by a private
defendant. A minimum financial damages award for private plaintiffs
who successfully litigate a defamation per se claim would provide much
needed clarity for litigants and ensure that the presumed damages doctrine
has sufficient practical value. While a minimum financial damages award
floor will not provide a perfect solution in every case, it is certainly better
than abolishing the presumed damages doctrine or perpetuating the current
state of uncertainty related to presumed damages awards. Ultimately,
perfection should not be the enemy of the very good.

and invariable principle in laws of England, that every right when withheld must have
a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 162–63 (1803) (“If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the
laws of his country afford him a remedy? The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”).
220. See supra Part III.
221. See supra Parts III–IV.
222. Supra note 133.
223. See supra Part IV.
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